The Effect of Auditor Choice on Financing Decisions

We provide evidence that the financing decisions of companies that are audited by a Big Six auditor are less affected by information asymmetry. Specifically, these companies enjoy greater financial flexibility and depend less on favorable market conditions for their equity issuance decisions than those not audited by a Big Six firm. As a consequence, their debt ratios are less affected either by their past stock price performance or by Baker and Wurgler's [2002] measure of market timing. In addition, consistent with the idea that these firms are able to issue equity more regularly, we find that these firms have lower target debt ratios. These results are economically significant. They are robust to endogenizing the selection of the auditor and they hold both cross-sectionally and in panel settings.Information asymmetry, Capital Structure, Auditor Quality

Multinational enterprises, cross-border acquisitions, and government policy

This paper analyzes the optimality of policy specifications used to regulate the acquisition and operation of local firms by multinational enterprises (MNE). We emphasize the consequence of such regulation on the price of the domestic firm in the market for corporate control. We show that it is optimal to impose ceilings on foreign ownership of domestic firms when the government's objective is to maximize domestic shareholder profits. While the optimal ceiling is high enough for the MNE to gain control of the domestic firm, it nevertheless influences the price that the MNE must pay for the domestic firm's shares to the advantage of the domestic shareholders. Restrictions on transfer pricing are either irrelevant or strictly suboptimal. The consequences of alternative specifications of the government's objective function are also analyzed.Acquisition; Control; Multinational Enterprises; Transfer pricing

Discipline or disruption?:stakeholder relationships and the effect of takeover threat

While a sizable literature suggests that firms benefit from vulnerability to takeovers because it reduces agency problems, the threat of takeovers can also impose ex ante costs on firms by adversely affecting relationships with important stakeholders, such as major customers. We find that when firms have corporate customers as important stakeholders, an exogenous reduction in the threat of takeovers increases their ability to attract new customers and strengthens their relationships with existing customers, resulting in improvement in operating performance. The positive effect on operating performance is greater for suppliers that are likely to offer unique and durable products to their customers. Our results suggest a beneficial aspect of protection from takeovers when stakeholder relationships are important

Transparency, price informativeness, and stock return synchronicity: Theory and evidence

This paper argues that contrary to the conventional wisdom, stock return synchronicity (or R(2)) can Increase when transparency improves In a simple model, we show that in more transparent environments stock prices should be more informative about future events Consequently when the events actually happen in the future there should be less surprise" (i e less new information is impounded into the stock price) Thus a more informative stock price today means higher return synchronicity in the future We find empirical support for our theoretical predictions in 3 settings namely firm age seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), and listing of American Depositary Receipts (ADRs

Inventory Behavior and Financial Constraints:Theory and Evidence

We model the interaction of financial constraints, capacity constraints, and the response of production and inventory to cost and demand shocks. The model predicts that in response to favorable shocks, financially constrained firms are unable to build inventory as rapidly as are unconstrained firms. However, because the favorable shocks gradually ease the financial constraints, constrained firms continue to build inventory and eventually carry surplus inventory (relative to unconstrained firms) to unfavorable states. This allows them to deplete inventory more aggressively in response to unfavorable shocks. Our empirical evidence provides broad support for the model’s predictions

Anti-Collusion Enforcements:Justice for Consumers and Equity for Firms

We consider the case of changing competition that comes from stronger antitrust enforcement around the world to show that, as the equilibrium switches from collusion to oligopolistic competition, firms step up investment and increase equity issuance. As a result, debt ratios fall. These results imply the importance of financial flexibility in surviving competitive threats. Our identification relies on a difference-in-differences estimation based on the staggered passage of leniency programs in 63 countries around the world from 1990 to 2012

Does Pay Activism Pay Off for Shareholders?:Shareholder Democracy and its Discontents

Typically, shareholders are not sure whether boards act in their interest or have been captured by management. They are also less well informed than boards about firm investment opportunities and operating conditions. We develop a model, consistent with these observations, in which discretionary compensation payments to managers might increase firm value or might simply enrich managers at the expense of shareholders. After observing the board’s compensation and investment policies, shareholders use Bayes’s rule to update the probability that the board is captured. Shareholders are “outraged” if this updated probability is sufficiently large. Outrage is costly for the board. Shareholder democracy, by enabling outrage to constrain board actions, typically lowers firm value relative to either governance regimes that insulate boards from shareholder outrage or regimes that ban discretionary compensation altogether

Reputation and loan contract terms:the role of principal customers

Principal customers have strong incentives to screen and/or monitor suppliers to ensure supply-chain stability; consequently, the implicit certification from the existence of long-term relationships with principal customers has reputational consequences that potentially spill over to other markets. We argue that one such consequence is smaller loan spreads and looser loan covenants on bank loans, as firms that are able to hold on to principal customers longer are perceived as safer firms by banks. We address causality and endogeneity issues via a variety of tests and find consistent results. Our study suggests that non-financial stakeholders can have important effects on the decisions of financial stakeholders

Product Market Competition Shocks, Firm Performance, and Forced CEO Turnover

We examine the effect of competition shocks induced by major industry-level tariff cuts on forced CEO turnover. Both the likelihood of forced CEO turnover and its sensitivity to performance increase. These effects are stronger for firms exposed to greater predation risk and with products more similar to those of other firms. CEOs are more likely to be forced out in weak governance firms; however, in good governance firms, CEOs are offered higher incentive pay. New outside CEOs receive higher incentive pay and come from firms with lower cost structures and higher asset sales. Performance and productivity improve after forced turnover